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DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNECTICUT
CRIMINAL LAW: 2008
By TIMOTHY H. EVERETT*
This article surveys criminal cases decided by
Connecticut's higher courts in 2008, without hope of com-
pleteness but with the aim to identify cases that are "must
reads" and "must re-reads" for members of the Bar. The
Connecticut Supreme Court decided several especially signif-
icant cases in 2008. In a long, nonunanimous decision, State
v. DeJesus,1 the Supreme Court grappled with the relation
between the new Code of Evidence and the Supreme Court's
inherent powers under the common law and the state consti-
tution. After concluding that adoption of the Code of
Evidence had not altered its own authority to make common-
law rules of evidence, the DeJesus Court announced a new
"propensity" exception to the law governing use of uncharged
misconduct evidence; the Court has already begun to map out
the parameters of this propensity exception. 2 In State v.
Salamon,3 the Court corrected its past construction of the
abduction element in kidnapping, distinguishing it from
unlawful restraint; in so doing the Court overruled long-stand-
ing precedent that the Court had affirmed as recently as 2002.
By design the Appellate Court decides most of the cases
on its large docket by careful application of established legal
paradigms, not by reconsidering precedent and fashioning
novel law. 4 The Appellate Court plays a critical role in the
development of Connecticut criminal law and procedure,
both through those relatively few of its decisions that the
Supreme Court selects for further review and, as importantly,
by providing "the final word" in the vast majority of crimi-
nal appeals taken from the Superior Court. Its middle
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
288 Conn. 418 (2008).
2 State v. Snelgrove, 288 Conn. 742 (2008); State v. Johnson, 289 Conn. 437
(2008).
3 287 Conn. 509, 513 n.6, 542-43 (2008) (overruling State v. Luurtsema, 262
Conn. 179 (2002)).
4 Because the Appellate Court typically sits in panels of three, it is significant
when the Court sits en banc in a criminal case, but the Court did not do so in 2008.
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tier vantage point and high volume docket place the
Appellate Court in a special role, with comparatively direct
and usually final oversight of actual criminal practice in the
trial courthouses of the State. 5 This review cannot cover the
extensive array of cases decided by the Appellate Court last
year, so it includes a somewhat idiosyncratic sampling of
some of the more interesting ones.
I. APPELLATE Box SCORES AND RECAPS
In 2008 the Connecticut Supreme Court decided fifty-two
cases involving criminal law. Forty-three were direct
appeals from criminal judgments in the Superior Court,
seven were appeals of Superior Court decisions on habeas
corpus petitions, one was a Writ of Error from conviction of
summary contempt, and one was an interlocutory appeal
authorized by the Chief Justice in the interests of justice pur-
suant to General Statutes Section 52-265a. The Supreme
Court fashioned its docket by transferring twenty-one cases
from the Appellate Court this year and granting certification
to review issues previously decided in the Appellate Court in
another nineteen cases. Of the cases first decided by the
5 For just one example of the court's important vantage point on the day-to-day
realities of actual criminal practice in G.A. and J.D. courthouses, see Chief Judge
Flynn's concurrence in State v. Outlaw, 108 Conn. App. 772, cert. denied, 289
Conn. 915 (2008). The Outlaw majority rejected the defendant's sufficiency of the
evidence challenge to a jury's conviction for willful failure to appear for sentencing
in a previous criminal case. Id. at 776-80. The defendant testified that he had been
in the courthouse on the date in question but that his lawyer told him that he could
leave and that sentencing would be rescheduled. Chief Judge Flynn agreed with the
sufficiency holding, but rued the fact that on appeal there was no claim that the trial
court erred when it failed to give a requested jury charge on the role of trial coun-
sel's advice. Id. at 788. Chief Judge Flynn's concurrence drew attention to an
important reality of criminal practice in Connecticut courthouses: "My concern lies
not in what the majority opinion says, but in what it does not say. On a daily basis,
defendants are instructed by their attorneys, by court personnel and by prosecutors
that their cases will not be going forward on that particular day or that a dismissal
or nolle will be recommended and, therefore, that they need not be present and are
free to leave. This avoids wasting the time of both the court and Connecticut citizens
who are called to court when, for one good reason or another, cases cannot be heard
or disposed of on that day can be disposed of quickly without the presence of the
defendant. Early every morning, lines form in the courthouses of our Superior
Courts, filled with defendants waiting to meet with prosecutors on motor vehicle
infractions. Many of these defendants are told that the case will be nolled for vari-
ous reasons and that they should leave the courthouse. Unless the presiding judge
has forbade such common practices a defendant should be able to rely on such state-
ments without facing criminal charges. " (Emphasis added.) Id. at 787-88.
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Appellate Court, the Supreme Court affirmed nine times and
reversed or modified the Appellate Court's decision ten
times. The Supreme Court sat en banc in three criminal
cases, but fell short of unanimity in deciding each.6
The Supreme Court did not review any capital cases result-
ing in the death penalty 7 in 2008, though it did review a cap-
ital case in which a young defendant was given a life sentence
without the possibility of parole. 8 The Court decided a broad
range of issues in the administration of criminal justice and
constitutional rights, including protection of a complainant's
mental health records, 9 calculation of the time that a defen-
6 State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 (2008) (6-1 decision; Chief Justice Rogers'
plurality opinion, joined by two justices, id. at 420-77, held that adoption of
Connecticut Code of Evidence was not meant to alter the Supreme Court's common-
law authority to adopt and modify rules of evidence; Justice Palmer, concurring, Id.
at 477-88, agreed that the Court retained its common-law authority over evidentiary
law, following a different analytic path; Justice Zarella, joined by Justice Sullivan,
Id. at 488-94, also concurred, "like Justice Palmer, that the judges of the Superior
Court do not possess authority under our constitution to divest this court of its inher-
ent authority to change and develop the law of evidence." Id. at 490; Justice Katz,
dissenting, Id. at 494-547, with the view that the process leading to the adoption of
the Code did alter the Supreme Court's common-law authority over established, i.e.,
codified, rules of evidence and that it is now limited to interpreting and applying
those rules in individual cases; see discussion, infra); State v. Salamon, 287 Conn.
509, 517-50 (2008) (4-3 decision overruling long-standing interpretation of the
abduction element for kidnapping by recognizing that merely incidental restraint of
victim during commission of another offense constitutes unlawful restraint, not
abduction); State v. T.R.D., 286 Conn. 191, 198-206 (2008) (5-2 holding that can-
vas of defendant was inadequate to establish waiver of right to trial counsel under
federal constitution because canvas did not ensure defendant had a "meaningful
appreciation" of his criminal exposure if convicted).
7 The Supreme Court heard extended argument in a capital case, State v.
Courchesne, on March 19, 2008, but as of June 15, 2009, the court has not issued its
opinion. Meanwhile, a bill to abolish the death penalty passed both houses of the
state legislature, a surprising turn of events, given the enduring shock waves stem-
ming from the home invasion and multiple murders in Cheshire, Connecticut, in the
summer of 2007. Governor Rell has vetoed the abolition bill.
8 State v. Allen, 289 Conn. 550 (2008). The Allen Court rejected the defen-
dant's claim that his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
because he was under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the
offense. Id. at 582-85 (tracking Delaware Supreme Court's reasoning in rejecting
"an identical claim" in Wallace v. State, 956 A.2d 630 (Del. 2008)).
9 State v. Kemah, 289 Conn. 411 (2008). Justice Katz wrote the Kemah opin-
ion, sustaining the state's public interest appeal and holding that a complaining wit-
ness who voluntarily disclosed confidential mental health records to police and pros-
ecutors had not thereby broadly waived statutory confidentiality of those records so
as to relieve trial court of its gate-keeping function under State v. Esposito, 192
Conn. 166 (1984). Under Esposito "two levels of consent from the holder of the
privilege are required before a defendant may obtain access to confidential
CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL
dant may be kept in placements intended to restore his com-
petency,' 0 the need to instruct a jury on the distinction
between "true threats" and constitutionally protected
speech, l l when a continuance at the state's request converts
to a nolle prosequi,12 and various suppression, consolidation
and severance, evidentiary, and trial process issues.
If the Supreme Court docket year included a sizeable
squadron of criminal cases, the Appellate Court docket com-
prised a veritable flotilla of criminal cases demanding deci-
sion. By written opinions (not counting memorandum deci-
sions), the Appellate Court decided one hundred sixty-four
direct appeals from judgment in criminal cases, sixty-eight
appeals in habeas corpus cases, and five other cases presenting
criminal law issues via less common procedural actions, such
as petitions for a new trial and extraordinary writs.
As noted before, the Appellate Court's work is most often the
last word in a criminal case. The Court decided too many cases
to recite. Just a few of the interesting decisions show the range
of issues the Court handles. In State v. Re 13 the Court held that
it was not double jeopardy to convict and sentence a defendant
for both manslaughter in the second degree and manslaughter in
the second degree with a motor vehicle where the defendant,
driving while intoxicated, caused the death of one person. 14 In
records--consent to an in camera review and consent to disclose to the defendant
any impeachment or exculpatory evidence that the court's review yields.
Kemah, 289 Conn. at 426.
10 State v. Jenkins, 288 Conn. 610, 625-28 (2008) (multiple placements are
cumulative in determining whetherl8-month limitation in CONN. GEN. STAT. §54-
56d(i) has been exceeded).
11 State v. Cook, 287 Conn. 237, 250-53, cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 464, 172
L.Ed.2d 328 (2008) (reversed conviction for carrying a dangerous weapon, a wood-
en table leg, because "the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that it
could not find the defendant guilty .. .unless it found, on the basis of the defen-
dant's conduct or statements, that his alleged threat to use the table leg constituted a
true threat and not simply idle talk, banter or some other form of protected expres-
sion." Id. at 252).
12 State v. Winer, 286 Conn. 666 (2008) (state request to put case on firm jury
list was not request for continuance triggering thirteen-month nolle and erasure rule
in CONN. GEN. STAT. §54-142a(c)).
13 State v. Re, 111 Conn. App. 466 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 908 (2009).
14 Id. at 470-72 (2008) (CoNN. GEN. STAT. §53a-56(a)(l) and CONN. GEN. STAT.
§53a-56b(a) are not the "same offense" under Blockburger test and there is no indica-
tion in text or history of statutes that legislature did not intend to authorize conviction
and punishment for each separately; however, the Court did find that the judgments
of conviction on two counts of driving while intoxicated was double jeopardy).
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State v. Martin15 the Court held that it was double jeopardy to
convict a defendant of both felony possession of marijuana
for his possession of 4.4 ounces of marijuana and attempted
possession of more than a kilogram of marijuana where the
police had removed all but the 4.4 ounces of marijuana from
a mail package containing 18 pounds of marijuana before the
defendant took possession of what he expected would be the
larger amount. 16 In State v. Bonner17 the Court held that the
trial court properly applied collateral estoppel when it refused
to hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to
suppress narcotics found after his arrest which he claimed was
not supported by probable cause, because another court in a
murder case had heard and rejected his motion to suppress his
statement to police as fruit of an illegal arrest. 18 In State v.
Ayuso'9 the Court held that a trial witness was properly per-
mitted to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege and that the
trial court properly refused to order the state to use its statu-
tory power to accord immunity to certain witnesses. In State
v. Callahan20 the Court found that the trial court had not
erred in terminating a defendant's accelerated rehabilitation
upon finding that she "had not complied with the court's
order to send a genuine letter of apology to a person whom
the defendant had accused of harassment." 21  In State v.
15 State v. Martin, 110 Conn. App. 171 (2008), cert. granted, 289 Conn. 944
(2008) (certified issue: "Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that a convic-
tion for possession of four ounces or more of marijuana in violation of General
Statutes § 21a-279 (b) should be merged with the conviction of attempt to possess
one kilogram or more of marijuana with the intent to sell in violation of General
Statutes §§ 21a-278 (b) and 53a-49?").
16 Id. at 175-80 (Blockburger test not appropriate where "but for the actions of
the police, the defendant would [not] have been charged with multiple offenses." Id.
at 177).
17 State v. Bonner, 110 Conn. App. 621, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955 (2008).
18 Id. at 625-33.
19 105 Conn. App. 305, 309-19, cert. denied, 286 Conn. 911 (2008).
20 108 Conn. App. 605, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 916 (2008).
21 Id. at 608. The trial court found that the defendant's letter was "'an insincere
apology"' and the Appellate Court agreed, rejecting the defendant's argument "that
the court was bound to find acceptable as an apology any document using any form
of the word 'apology,' no matter how hedged by accompanying verbiage." Id. at
612. The Court also found that any claims that the condition set by the court inter-
fered with the defendant's right against self-incrimination and was an acknowledg-
ment of guilt inconsistent with the AR program were waived when the defendant
agreed to the condition when the program was granted. Id. at 610-11.
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Houle22 the Court reversed and ordered a new trial where the
jury's conviction of the defendant of third degree arson and
first degree criminal mischief depended on "proof of irrecon-
cilably' inconsistent states of mind."
II. WHAT Is THE CONNECTICUT CODE OF EVIDENCE?
The philosophically most far-reaching Supreme Court
decision of the year was its en banc, split decision in State v.
DeJesus,23 affirming the Appellate Court's 2005 decision
upholding the application of a special liberal rule of admissi-
bility for uncharged misconduct evidence in prosecution of
sex offenses. 24 However, the Supreme Court affirmed on
alternative grounds unavailable to the Appellate Court,
which had correctly considered itself bound by decisional
law of the Supreme Court prior to DeJesus. Prior decisional
law had grounded the liberal rule of admissibility in excep-
tions to the general rule against character evidence, though it
sometimes required strained logic to apply them to
uncharged misconduct in sex prosecutions.
The Connecticut Code of Evidence, adopted in 2000,
makes no express reference to the liberal rule,25 but the Code
was intended to incorporate, unaltered, the decisional law of
evidence in existence at the time of the Code's adoption. 26
Noting that its status as "an intermediate appellate court"
barred it from adopting the opinion of a dissenting Supreme
Court justice27 or otherwise reconsidering or revising
Supreme Court precedent, then Judge (later Justice) Schaller
for the Appellate Court in 2005 had rejected DeJesus's argu-
ments asking for a new gloss on, or outright rejection of, the
liberal rule of admissibility.28 That constituted the central
22 State v. Houle, 105 Conn. App. 813, 817-18, 827 (2008).
23 288 Conn. 418 (2008).
24 State v. DeJesus, 91 Conn. App. 47 (2005), cert. granted, 279 Conn. 912 (2006).
25 See State v. Kulmac, 230 Conn. 43, 60-61 (1994).
26 See Code of Evidence § 1-2(a) and Commentary thereto ("Purposes of the
Code.").
27 The reference is to Justice Katz's dissent in Kulmac, 230 Conn. at 86-88. Justice
Katz was already on record with her position that, post-Code, the Supreme Court itself
no longer could change the liberal rule of admissibility-which she continued to
oppose. See State v. Sawyer, 279 Conn. 331, 362-66 (2006) (Katz, J., concurring).
28 DeJesus, 91 Conn. App. at 58 n. 4 and 60 n. 5.
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issue29 the Supreme Court certified for appeal: "Does this
court, or any court, have the authority in light of the
Connecticut Code of Evidence, to reconsider the rule that the
introductions of prior sexual misconduct of the defendant in
sexual assault cases, is viewed under a relaxed standard?" 30
The De.Jesus Court, sitting en banc, spoke in many voices in
answering the certified question in the affirmative. 31 The
upshot is that adoption of the Code did not diminish the
Sipreme Court's pre-Code authority to change or modify
evidence law and that the Supreme Court itself is not bound
by the Code.
The DeJesus decision resolved that the Code of Evidence
does not bind the Supreme Court, but it leaves other issues
concerning the legal force of the Code in a state of uneasy
irresolution. What, if anything, is "new" in the law of evi-
dence after the Code's adoption by vote of the judges of the
Superior Court in 2000? Is it an actual "code" setting forth
rules that govern evidence law or is it merely a well-com-
posed snapshot of the common-law principles that govern
evidence practice? Does the Code have any effect whatsoev-
er on the common-law process by which Connecticut evi-
dence law has always been applied and developed? Is the
Code less binding on trial courts than the Connecticut
Practice Book? Is there any reason hereafter to change the
Code except to conform to any new appellate decisions that
change the common law of evidence or to conform to any
statutes that change evidence law?
In State v. Sawyer 32 in 2006 the Supreme Court had recog-
nized that the Code's very existence raised a question regard-
29 The Supreme Court also agreed to review the state's claim that the Appellate
Court had incorrectly reversed the defendant's kidnapping conviction on vagueness
grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, applying its just mint-
ed clarification of the distinction between the abduction element of kidnapping and
unlawful restraint. State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. at 421, 428-39 (applying State v.
Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 542 (2008)).
30 State v. DeJesus, 279 Conn. at 912; State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. at 421 n. 4.
31 On the Code status issue, Chief Justice Rogers (joined by Justices Norcott
and Vertefeuille) wrote a plurality opinion, Justice Palmer concurred in a separate
opinion, Justice Zarella (joined by Justice Sullivan) concurred separately, and
Justice Katz dissented. DeJesus, 288 Conn. at 439-62 (Rogers, C.J.), 477-88
(Palmer, J.), 489-94 (Zarella, J.), 494-528 (Katz, J.).
32 279 Conn. 331 (2006).
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ing the ongoing vitality of the Court's pre-Code power to mod-
ify and change Connecticut's common-law rules of evidence
(though not its statutory rules of evidence). But the Sawyer
majority did not find it necessary to decide whether the Code
had changed the high court's role in changing, as opposed to
interpreting and applying, Connecticut's common-law rules of
evidence. 33 Although Justices Borden and Katz staked out
clear positions on the legal foundation for the Code's authori-
ty,34 the Sawyer majority hesitated. 35 Meanwhile, those who
had helped to draft the Code went public with their explana-
tions of its purposes and provenance. 36  In April 2008 the
Supreme Court side-stepped another opportunity to define the
nature of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. 37 Then, in
33 The Sawyer majority opinion tergiversated on the implications of the Code's
adoption for the Court's own authority: "[W]e acknowledge that, since 2000, the
year in which the Connecticut Code of Evidence was adopted, the authority to
change the rules of evidence lies with the judges of the Superior Court in the dis-
charge of their rule-making function. ... To the extent that our evidentiary rules may
be deemed to implicate substantive rights, we believe that it is unclear whether those
rules properly are the subject of judicial rule making rather than the subject of com-
mon-law adjudication." Id. at 331 n. 1.
34 Justice Katz and Justice Borden, in separate opinions, each declared unam-
biguously that changes to existing evidence law set out in the Code may be made
only by the judges of the Superior Court in an exercise of their "rule making" func-
tion and with the guidance of its evidence oversight committee. Katz and Borden
each declared that in the Code era the Supreme Court retains authority only to inter-
pret and apply rules of evidence. Id. at 362-66 (Katz, J.), 366-93 (Borden, J.).
35 See discussion of State v. Sawyer, 279 Conn. 331 (2006) and State v. John
M., 94 Conn. App. 667, subsequently reversed, 285 Conn. 528 (2008), in C. TAIT
AND E. PREscOTr, TAIT's HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE (4th ed. 2008) §
1.3, pp. 17-19 ("These two cases undermine the status of the Code as the definitive
repository of the rules of evidence, and vitiate the basic purpose of a code to encap-
sulate the rules in one authoritative source. Until these issues are resolved, the hege-
mony of the Code will remain in limbo." Id. at 17). See also discussion in T.H.
Everett, Developments in Connecticut Criminal Law: 2006, 81 CONN. BAR J. 161,
171-75 (2007) ("SETTING THE BOUNDS FOR EVIDENTIARY REVIEW UNDER THE CODE:
STATE V SAWYER").
36 The chair of the committee that drafted the Code, Justice Borden, had already
published in this journal. D. Borden, The New Code of Evidence: A (Very) Brief
Introduction and Overview, 73 CONN. BAR J. 210-20 (1999). Professor Tait, who
served on the drafting committee and serves on the evidence oversight committee,
and his co-author Judge Prescott examined the relation of the Code to the state con-
stitution, the common law, future case law, statutory rules of evidence, and the
Practice Book. C. TAIT AND E. PREscoTT, TAIT's HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT
EVIDENCE, §§ 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (4th ed. 2008).
37 In State v. John FM., 285 Conn. 528 (2008), the Court reversed the Appellate
Court without addressing the Appellate Court's premise that a conflict between deci-
sional law of the Supreme Court and the Code of Evidence would have to be
resolved in favor of the Supreme Court. See State v. John M., 94 Conn. App. 667,
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August 2008 the Supreme Court decided DeJesus.
The much-awaited outcome in DeJesus was not presaged
by previous cases decided under the new Code since 2000,
most notably State v. Sawyer. Chief Justice Rogers wrote the
opinion of the Court in DeJesus, joined by Justices Norcott
and Vertefeuille, concluding, inter alia, that judges of the
Superior Court in adopting the Code had not actually
"intended to divest this court of its long-standing inherent
common-law adjudicative authority over evidentiary law." 38
Separately concurring in the result, Justice Palmer and
Justice Zarella (joined by Justice Sullivan) eschewed the
majority's reliance on what the Superior Court judges had
intended in fact, 39 emphasizing instead the formal reasons
why the Supreme Court's authority is theoretically irre-
ducible by a vote of the judges of the Superior Court. Justice
Zarella wrote: "I conclude, like Justice Palmer, that the
judges of the Superior Court do not possess authority under
our constitution to divest this court of its inherent authority to
change and develop the law of evidence." 40
Justice Katz filed a fifty-four page dissent in DeJesus,4 1
taking the position that the Code is "a judicial codification of
general rules of prospective application" and that "[t]hese
rules are the functional equivalent of laws." 42 Katz's opinion
is a "must read" that explains the purpose and legitimacy of
the new Code that she and former Justice Borden consistent-
672-73 n.5 (2006) (Noting an apparent conflict between an 1827 case, State v.
Roswell, 6 Conn. 446 (1827), and Code § 8-3: "we know of no authority indicating
that a decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court may be overruled by the promul-
gation of rules of evidence.").
38 DeJesus, 288 Conn. at 452; see also, id. at 455 n. 21.
39 Chief Justice Rogers's opinion also questioned whether the Code would be
constitutional if its purpose had been to divest the Supreme Court of its "common law
authority," itself codified in Article Fifth, § 1, of the Constitution of 1818, which
includes the "power to develop and change the law of evidence via case-by-case adju-
dication. " Id. at 459-60. Chief Justice Rogers declared: "We therefore decline to
construe the code in such a potentially unconstitutional manner, and conclude that the
evidentiary rules articulated therein are subject to change, modification, alteration or
amendment by this court in the exercise of its constitutional and common-law adju-
dicative authority. To reiterate, we conclude that the code neither is, nor was intend-
ed to be, anything more than a concise, authoritative and... 'readily accessible body
of rules to which the legal profession conveniently may refer."' Id. at 460.
40 Id. at 490 (Zarella, J., citing p. 485 of Justice Palmer's concurring opinion).
41 DeJesus, 288 Conn. at 494-547.
42 Id. at 494.
2009]
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ly espoused in Sawyer and during their many years of work
on the Code before and after its adoption. The prize for the
reader who journeys to the end of Katz's forlorn dissent is an
apology likening the Code's misfortune in DeJesus to the end
of A Midsummer Night's Dream: "Like Shakespeare's Puck,
I can only apologize to the audience and suggest that it also
pretend that this has all been a bad dream." 43
While all the justices, but Justice Katz, subscribed to the
DeJesus holding that the Court's traditional powers are unaf-
fected by adoption of the Code, their differing rationales leave
the legal foundation of the Code unsettled and the path (or
paths) for future development of evidence law unclear. The
six justices who concurred in the holding varied substantially
in their reasoning. Chief Justice Rogers found that Code
Section 1-2 (a), the provision governing growth and develop-
ment of evidence law in the future, uses two terms, "interpre-
tation" and "judicial rule-making," that are ambiguous44 but
concluded that the adoption of the Code by the judges of the
Superior Court was not, as an empirical matter,45 intended to
change the Supreme Court's ultimate authority over evidence
law. Justice Palmer found that the terms "interpretation" and
"judicial rule-making" as used in Code Section 1-2 (a) are not
ambiguous46 but he and Justice Zarella concluded, as a theo-
retical matter, the Supreme Court has ultimate authority over
evidentiary law.4 7 Chief Justice Rogers and Justice Palmer
43 Id. at 547. Footnote 35 on page 547 contains Puck's last speech from the play.
44 Id. at 444-46 (Rogers, C.J.).
45 Chief Justice Rogers reviewed the "history" behind the Superior Court's adop-
tion of the Code and concluded that the Code was not intended to "divest this court
of its inherent authority to change and develop the law of evidence through case-by-
case common-law adjudication." DeJesus, 288 Conn. at 451 (emphasis in original).
Chief Justice Rogers further noted that Justice Borden had not addressed the divesti-
ture issue when he addressed the Superior Court judges at the meeting where the
Code was adopted: "There was no discussion of the effect, if any, that adoption of the
code would have upon this court's common-law adjudicative authority to change and
develop evidentiary law on a case-by-case basis, an inherent authority that it has
enjoyed since the seventeenth century." Id. (emphasis in original).
46 Id. at 480-81 and n.3 (Palmer, J.).
47 Id. at 485 (Palmer, J.) ("the ultimate authority to determine the law of evi-
dence has resided in this court since its inception, and no persuasive reason has been
proffered to support the contention that the judges of the Superior Court have the
power to assert that authority for themselves"); id. at 490-91 (Zarella, J.) ("the
judges of the Superior Court do not possess authority under our constitution to
divest this court of its inherent authority to change and develop the law of evidence.
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each acknowledged that the Court's common-law authority
over evidence law is less than absolute because the legislature
also makes evidence law. 48 Chief Justice Rogers wrote that
the Code's special provenance and limited purposes make it
different in kind from Superior Court Practice Book rules.49
Justice Palmer declared that the supervisory authority of the
Supreme Court is not subject to the rule-making authority of
the Superior Court so that even if the Code were legally on par
with Superior Court Practice Book rules, neither is ultimately
binding on the Supreme Court. 50 Justice Zarella would have
preferred that his colleagues not treat "our laws of evidence as
akin to rules of practice" in part because the case did not
require the Court to confront the "side effect" of such a com-
parison. 51 Chief Justice Rogers noted, and Justice Palmer
agreed, that the Code is also subject to "change, modification,
alteration or amendment by the Appellate Court in the exer-
... I am puzzled by the majority's failure to declare that the lack of constitutional
authority is clear."). Cf id. at 459-60 (Rogers, C.J.) ("we question whether the
judges of the Superior Court have the constitutional authority to adopt a code of evi-
dence" that is binding upon the Supreme Court).
48 Id. at 462 n. 31 (Rogers, C.J.) (statutes modifying the common law of evi-
dence "'have never been challenged as violating the principle of separation of pow-
ers."' (quoting State v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 560 (1989)); id. at 485 n. 7 (Palmer,
J.) (citing State v. James).
49 Id. at 460-61 (Rogers, C.J.) ("we conclude that the code neither is, nor was
intended to be, anything more than a concise, authoritative and, as the commentary
to § 1-2 (a) of the code describes it, 'readily accessible body of rules to which the
legal profession conveniently may refer.' [new ] Our conclusion on this point is
predicated on the unique procedural and factual history of the code and, as such,
should not be construed to extend to the rules of practice codified in the Practice
Book." (emphasis added)).
50 Id. at 483-87 (Palmer, J.) ("I therefore view the rules of practice in the same
way that I view the code, namely, as a set of rules adopted by the judges of the
Superior Court that govern the manner in which cases are to proceed in our trial
courts. Under its common-law adjudicative authority, however, this court is the
final arbiter of any dispute between the parties regarding the interpretation of those
rules. Similarly, this court, by virtue of its inherent authority as the state's highest
court, ultimately retains the power-however infrequently it may choose to invoke
it-to establish the rules that govern the administration of justice in the courts of this
state." Id. at 487).
51 "By treating our laws of evidence as akin to rules of practice, my colleagues
fail to credit these historically significant differences in the origins of each body of
rules, as well as the importance of these differences in determining the judicial body
with ultimate authority. [new ] A side effect of this appears to be Justice Palmer's
conclusion that this court has authority to change, modify or enact a rule of practice,
a conclusion that I suggest is premature in light of the language of the 1808 statute
and the fact that the present case does not present a challenge to this court's author-
ity over the rules of practice." Id. at 493.
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cise of its constitutional and common-law adjudicative
authority" if not inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions. 52
In any event, many questions raised by adoption of the
Code remain unanswered by a majority of the current
Supreme Court. The issues generated in the various opinions
in DeJesus may eventually be resolved judicially. Another
possibility is that the legislature may someday take a more
formal stance on its own role in making evidence law, 53
though coordination between the judiciary and the legislature
to avoid a separation of powers conflict seems likelier, given
the political reality that "rigid lines of demarcation cannot be
reconciled with the operational interdependence of the three
branches of government that marks the modem state." 54
More down to earth and of immediate interest is the
impact that DeJesus will have on the work of the Code of
Evidence Oversight Committee 55 and the adjudicative work
52 Id. at 460 n. 28 (Rogers, C.J.). See also id. at 481 n. 4 (Palmer, J.).
53 For example, Senate Substitute Bill No. 1479 for the January 2007 legislative
session, favorably reported out of the Committee on the Judiciary on April 13, 2007
and later passed in the Senate, would have amended CONN. GEN. STAT. §51-14(a) to
add "rules of evidence" to the already statutorily authorized rule-making powers of
the courts ("rules and forms regulating pleading, practice and procedure") and
would have required that "any proposed new rule and any change in any existing
rule" be submitted to the judiciary committee "for approval or disapproval in its
entirety" within ninety days of submission, with approval by default if not acted on
in that time period. Had Senate Bill 1479 passed, it is conceivable that the legisla-
ture could disapprove a new decisional rule, once made part of the Code of
Evidence, creating an impasse in which the decisional rule would be "good law" in
the eyes of the Supreme Court but "bad law" in the eyes of the Judiciary Committee
(thus not part of the Code unless the Code were to take a cue from certain baseball
records by using asterisks to indicate debatable legitimacy).
54 Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away From the Federal Paradigm: Separation of
Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1563-64 (1997) (emphasis added).
Describing "state trial courts in action," then Senior Justice Peters wrote:
"Operationally, at least in Connecticut, separation of powers is largely irrelevant to
much of the work of trial court judges and administrators. The governing principle
is not separation but networking." Id. at 1560-61. Justice Peters explained by way
of example that state judicial administrators track pending bills in the legislature and
use staff to "influence the language, content, and effect of pending legislation to
minimize the risk of future points of conflict[]" and that "advance notice of pending
legislation affords the judiciary the opportunity to exercise its rule-making authori-
ty and amend judicial rules to conform to forthcoming legislative policy initiatives."
Id. at 1561.
55 Id. at 452 (Rogers, C.J.) (noting that the mission of the Code of Evidence
Oversight Committee is not defined: "It is unclear, for example, whether the judges
intended for the committee to recommend substantive revisions to the code, such as
overruling well established common-law evidentiary rules developed by this court,
[Vol. 83
2009] DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNECTICUT CRIMINAL LAW 2008 175
of lower courts in cases in which litigants challenge provi-
sions in the Code. 56 For the time being it appears that the
Oversight Committee could consider and make recommen-
dations on proposed changes to the Code and that the judges
of the Superior Court could vote on proposed changes, but
that only the trial courts are obliged to follow the Code. Even
the latter proposition should be hedged, since failure to
employ the Code may not matter on appeal as long as trial
courts have used binding decisional law accurately and as
long as the reviewing court does not consider use of the Code
critical to providing an adequate record for appellate
review. 57 Trial practitioners will cautiously follow the Code
while bearing in mind that the duty to make an adequate
record for appeal may occasionally require challenging not
just applications of the Code but the Code itself so that courts
of review might be persuaded to modify or change the Code
in an exercise of their preserved common-law authority over
rules of evidence.
or whether the judges intended for the recommendations of the committee to be lim-
ited in scope, such as filling in gaps in evideftiary law and updating the code to
reflect changes in evidentiary law developed by this court through the traditional
common-law method of case-by-case adjudication.").
56 The philosophic and pragmatic implications of DeJesus will take time to be
fully explored by actual practitioners and by seasoned commentators on Connecticut
law and practice. Reflecting on the case's broader implications for civil and crimi-
nal practice alike, Horton and Bartschi have already weighed in with eight provoca-
tive questions and eight provisional answers suggested by the various opinions of
the various justices in DeJesus. Wesley W. Horton and Kenneth J. Bartschi, 2008
Connecticut Appellate Review, 83 CONN. BAR J. 1, 5-9 (2009). No doubt Professor
Tait and Judge Prescott will address the implications of DeJesus in their next pock-
et part, amending, or altogether revamping, their pre-DeJesus description of the
manner in which rules of evidence may be changed in the Code era: "The future
development of the law of evidence will be accomplished through the rule-making
process and common-law development . . .when amending the Code, the judges
should adopt procedures analogous to those utilized when amending the Practice
Book." COLIN C. TAIT AND ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT's HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT
EVIDENCE (4th ed. 2008), § 1.6.3, p. 25.
57 See State v. Calabrese, 279 Conn. 393, 407-09 n. 18 (2006) (rejected state's
claim that citation to Code always necessary to alert trial court and preserve evi-
dentiary claim for appellate review). When I discussed Calabrese in Developments
in Criminal Law: 2006, 81 CONN. B.J. 161, 175 (2007), I presented it as an atypical
instance in which the reviewing court showed a willingness to look functionally at
the record and to forgive a formal deficiency, making the lesson of the case to be
that failure to cite the Code at trial could bar appellate review in other instances.
After DeJesus, the role of the Code in providing an adequate record for review under
Practice Book §§ 60-5 and 61-10 is less clear than before.
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III. A NEW LEGITIMACY FOR PROPENSITY EVIDENCE
It is easy to be distracted by the abstract issues raised in
DeJesus and to forget that the case is also of concrete impor-
tance. Having decided that it retained power to revisit estab-
lished rules of evidence, the Supreme Court did so, ultimate-
ly reaching a momentous decision to recognize a new
"propensity" paradigm that supports the Court's continued
commitment to a liberal rule of admissibility of uncharged
misconduct in prosecutions for sex offenses.
Finding that the Code of Evidence incorporated the com-
mon-law liberal rule for admissibility of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence in prosecutions for sexual offenses, 58 the
DeJesus Court entertained the defendant's argument that "the
liberal standard of admission should be overruled because it
is inadequate to demonstrate the existence of a genuine plan
in the defendant's mind, and crimes of a sexual nature are
neither more secretive, aberrant nor pathological than crimes
of a nonsexual nature."59 The Court agreed with the defen-
dant that the liberal rule has been used to discount need for a
genuine plan when applied to the common plan or scheme
exception. But the Court rejected the defendant's character-
ization of sexual crimes as non-secretive, non-aberrant and
non-pathological:
We agree with the defendant that the adoption of the code did
not divest this court of its inherent common-law adjudicative
authority to develop and change the rules of evidence on a
case-by-case basis. We further agree with the defendant that...
evidence of uncharged misconduct admitted under the liberal
standard ordinarily does not reflect the existence of a genuine
plan in the defendant's mind. Nonetheless, given the highly
secretive, aberrant and frequently compulsive nature of sex
crimes, we conclude that the admission of uncharged miscon-
duct evidence under the liberal standard is warranted and,
therefore, we adopt this standard as a limited exception to § 4-
5 (a) of the code, which prohibits the admission of "[e]vidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person... to prove the bad
character or criminal tendencies of that person."60
58 Id. at 443-44.
59 Id. at 439.
60 DeJesus, 288 Conn. at 439-40, 463-74.
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The Court forthrightly acknowledged that the challenged
liberal standard is not actually rooted in the common scheme
or plan exception to the rule against use of character evi-
dence: "Because the liberal standard does not focus on the
existence of an overall scheme or plan in the defendant's
mind that encompasses the commission of the charged and
uncharged crimes, but instead focuses on the similarity of the
charged and uncharged crimes, we now acknowledge that
evidence admitted under this standard ordinarily does not fall
within the 'true' common scheme or plan exception." 61
Rather than faulting the rule for lacking such underpinnings,
the Court legitimated it on an alternative basis. The Court for
the first time acknowledged that the liberal rule is actually a
propensity rule "rooted in this state's unique jurisprudence" 62
governing prosecution of sex crimes:
public policy considerations militate in favor of recognizing
a limited exception to the prohibition on the admission of
uncharged misconduct evidence in sex crime cases to prove
that the defendant had a propensity to engage in aberrant and
compulsive criminal sexual behavior. We therefore join the
federal courts, as well as a multitude of our sister states, that
recognize a similar propensity exception in sexual cases. 6 3
The new propensity rule permits use of uncharged sexual
misconduct evidence "only if it is relevant to prove that the
defendant had a propensity or a tendency to engage in the type
of aberrant and compulsive criminal sexual behavior with
which he or she is charged." 64 Admissibility of uncharged
misconduct evidence further depends upon evaluation of three
factors: (1) the uncharged conduct is "'not too remote in
time"'; (2) the uncharged misconduct is similar to the charged
conduct; and (3) the uncharged conduct was "'committed
61 Id. at 468.
62 Id. at 473 n.35 ("The scope and contours of the propensity exception to the
rule prohibiting the admission of uncharged misconduct that we adopt in this opin-
ion therefore are rooted in this state's unique jurisprudence concerning the admis-
sion of uncharged misconduct evidence in sex crime cases, and must be construed
accordingly. Consequently, we do not anticipate that our decision today will open
the floodgates to the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence that previously
was inadmissible under the common scheme or plan exception.").
63 Id. at 470 (emphasis in original).
64 Id. at 473.
CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL
upon persons similar to the prosecuting witness."', 6 5
Applying the new paradigm to the DeJesus case itself, the
Court noted that the uncharged misconduct evidence had not
been admissible for the purpose for which it was offered
(common scheme or plan), but that it was admissible as
propensity evidence, 66 and that the defendant could not show
harm because his only claim of harm was that the jury could
have misused the evidence "to infer that the defendant had a
propensity or a tendency to commit the crime of sexual
assault[," which is "the precise purpose" for which it can be
used under the new propensity paradigm. 67 The Court also
held that trial courts hereafter must give "an appropriate cau-
tionary instruction to the jury" when admitting propensity
evidence in sex cases. 68
The new exception has not (yet) been incorporated express-
ly into the Code of Evidence, though it has already been
applied on appeal by the Supreme Court in other cases. 69 In a
65 Id. at 473 (quoting State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 522 (2007)).
66 Id. at 474-75 ("although evidence of the defendant's uncharged misconduct
with N was inadmissible to prove the existence of a 'true' common scheme or plan
in the defendant's mind, it was admissible to prove that the defendant had a propen-
sity or a tendency to sexually assault young women of limited mental ability with
whom he worked and over whom he had supervisory authority.").
67 Id. at 476.
68 Id. at 474 n. 36. The "precise content" of the required instruction was not pre-
scribed, but an example was provided, id. at n.36, and the Criminal Jury Instructions
Committee has since drafted such an instruction: "In a criminal case in which the
defendant is charged with a crime exhibiting aberrant and compulsive criminal sexu-
al behavior, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses is
admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is rele-
vant. However, evidence of a prior offense on its own is not sufficient to prove the
defendant guilty of the crimes charged in the information .. " (Emphasis added.)
Connecticut Selected Jury Instructions Criminal §2.6-13 (new Nov. 1, 2008). Until
now trial courts instructed the jury in all cases that prior misconduct evidence was not
admitted to show propensity or tendency. In ordinary cases courts will still instruct
on that boundary: "The state has offered evidence of other acts of misconduct of the
defendant. This is not being admitted to prove the bad character of the defendant or
the defendant's tendency to commit criminal acts. Such evidence is being admitted
solely to show or establish that [purpose specified] .... ." (Emphasis added.)
Connecticut Selected Jury Instructions Criminal §2.6-5. See complete instructions at
the judicial web-site: http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/criminal/default.htm See State v.
Snelgrove, 288 Conn. 742, 757, 764 n.10 (2008) (ordinary standard charge used;
absence of propensity charge harmless).
69 If the new propensity rule is not ever codified, it creates a potentially con-
fusing duality in evidentiary doctrine, requiring lower courts to rely on the Code and
to check for decisional law inconsistent with the Code before deciding what evi-
dentiary rule controls. To the extent that there is a conflict between the Code and
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murder case, State v. Snelgrove,70 the defendant argued that
the trial court had admitted evidence of the defendant's com-
mission of two previous murders under a host of inapplicable
exceptions to the rule against character evidence and that "it
was probable that the jury would conclude that he was guilty
because he had a propensity to kill women for sexual rea-
sons." 71 Justice Vertefeuille for the Court concluded that the
DeJesus propensity paradigm may also be used in prosecu-
tions for non-sex crimes as long as the prosecuted crime and
the uncharged misconduct were both "driven by an aberrant
sexual compulsion." 72  The Court concluded that the propen-
sity exception was satisfied in Snelgrove as the evidence was
"not too remote in time," and involved similar sexual com-
pulsion and similar victims. 7 3 The Court noted that the prior
misconduct evidence was used "primarily 'to establish a nec-
essary motive or explanation for an otherwise inexplicably
the decisional law, at least De.Jesus settles that the decisional law prevails, especial-
ly if decided after the Code was adopted. Checking both rules and case law, of
course, has long been the bread and butter of trial practice, so it would be mistaken
to take DeJesus to have changed the pragmatics of trial evidentiary practice. Careful
practitioners will cite the Code in making a trial record because the Supreme Court
said nothing about its willingness to review evidentiary claims on appeal that ignore
the Code. But see State v. Calabrese, 279 Conn. 393, 407-08 n. 18, 408-09 (2006)
(rejected state's claim that citation to Code always necessary to alert trial court and
preserve evidentiary claim for appellate review) (discussed in Timothy H. Everett,
Developments in Criminal Law: 2006, 81 CoNN. B. J. 161, 175 (2007)).
70 288 Conn. 742 (2008).
71 Id. at 757-58.
72 Id. at 760. The Court explained: "[T]he exception to the rule barring propen-
sity evidence applies whenever the evidence establishes that both the prior miscon-
duct and the offense with which the defendant is charged were driven by an aberrant
sexual compulsion, regardless of whether the prior misconduct or the conduct at
issue resulted in sexual offense charges. Although we stated in DeJesus that '[t]he
scope and contours of the propensity exception to the rule prohibiting the admission
of uncharged misconduct ...[is] rooted in this state's unique jurisprudence con-
cerning the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence in sex crime cases, and
must be construed accordingly' (emphasis added) [DeJesus, 288 Conn. at] 473 n.35
...; nothing in that case suggests that it is the specific nature of the charges brought
against a defendant that renders the evidence especially probative in such cases.
Rather, DeJesus makes it clear that it is the aberrant and compulsive nature of the
defendant's prior misconduct that permits a fact finder to infer that, because the
defendant previously had engaged in such conduct, it is likely that he did so again.
As a matter of pure logic, this rationale applies whenever the state is using the evi-
dence of prior sexual proclivities 'to establish a necessary motive or explanation for
an otherwise inexplicably horrible crime'; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., at
469.. .; regardless of whether the crime itself was a sexual offense." Snelgrove, 288
Conn. at 760-61.
73 Id. at 761-64.
2009]
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horrible crime. " 74
Applying DeJesus and Snelgrove, the Court in State v.
Johnson75 found no error in the consolidation for trial of
three murder charges where the trial court had concluded that
"evidence of each murder was cross-admissible as to the
other two murders to prove both intent and a common plan or
scheme." 76 The Johnson Court noted that it was not neces-
sary to decide whether the trial court's rationale for deter-
mining cross-admissibility was sustainable because "the evi-
dence was cross admissible to demonstrate propensity" under
DeJesus and Snelgrove.77
IV. KIDNAPPING CLARIFIED: STATE V SALAMON
In State v. Salamon,78 in reviewing the defendant's chal-
lenge to the jury instruction on the intent element of kidnap-
ping in the second degree, the Supreme Court accepted the
defendant's invitation to "revisit and overrule our interpreta-
tion of this state's kidnapping statutes, most recently articu-
lated by this court in State v. Luurtsema,79 under which a per-
son who restrains another person with the intent to prevent
that person's liberation may be convicted of kidnapping even
though the restraint involved in the kidnapping is merely
incidental to the commission of another offense perpetrated
against the victim by the accused." 80 Justice Palmer wrote
the majority opinion, joined by Justices Borden, Norcott, and
Katz. Justice Borden added a short concurrence. 81 Justice
Zarella wrote separately, voicing strong disagreement with
74 Id. at 766 (quoting DeJesus, 288 Conn. at 469).
75 289 Conn. 437 (2008).
76 Id. at 439, 445, 448-49.
77 Id. at 439 n.3, 450, 455-57.
78 287 Conn. 509 (2008).
79 262 Conn. 179 (2002).
80 Id. at 513.
81 Id. at 574-76. Justice Borden writes: "I am persuaded by the majority opin-
ion's insight that, in establishing our prior kidnapping jurisprudence, this court never
fully analyzed the kidnapping statute, its historical background, and the anomalous
results that our jurisprudence was producing. In light of that analysis, which the
majority has now produced, I am convinced that, in enacting the kidnapping statutes,
the legislature did not intend that almost every assault, sexual assault or robbery
automatically would be elevated to a kidnapping, with its attendant heavy penalties
and opportunities for prosecutorial overcharging, simply by virtue of a minor
restraint of liberty that was inherent in the underlying crime. Such a result now
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the majority's holding but concurring in the remedy of a new
trial on kidnapping because the trial court failed to instruct
the jury adequately on the specific intent element of kidnap-
ping. 82 Justices Vertefeuille and Sullivan joined in Justice
Zarella's strongly stated opinion.
The majority opinion in Salamon begins with an interest-
ing discussion and rejection of the state's argument based on
"two separate but related principles" that it should not revis-
it established precedent: the principle of stare decisis and the
principle of statutory interpretation that militates against re-
visiting a judicial construction of a statute after the "legisla-
ture reasonably may be deemed to have acquiesced in that
construction." 83 The majority first analyzed the plain text of
the kidnapping and unlawful restraint statutes, as resort
extratextual would be inconsistent with General Statutes
Section 2-lz if a statutory text carries a plain, unambiguous
meaning: "The crime of kidnapping and other offenses pri-
marily involving restrictions of another person's liberty,
including unlawful restraint and custodial interference, are
set forth in part VII of the Connecticut Penal Code, General
Statutes Section 53a-91 et seq. Under those provisions, the
hallmark of a kidnapping is an abduction, whereas the hall-
mark of an unlawful restraint, a less serious crime, is a
restraint." 84 The majority notes that since 1977 it had reject-
strikes me .. .as anomalous and not consistent with the likely legislative intent. It
is time that we join the great majority of courts that have so concluded, as the major-
ity has aptly demonstrated." Id. at 576.
82 Id. at 576-608. Justice Zarella declared: "I disagree with the new interpreta-
tion of our kidnapping statutes that the majority announces in part I of its opinion
and with its conclusion in part III that unlawful restraint is a specific intent crime.
My disagreement with the majority is premised on what I believe to be serious flaws
in its construction of the plain language of the statutory scheme, its treatment of the
principle of stare decisis, and its usurpation of the roles of both the legislature and
the office of the state's attorney set forth in our state constitution. I agree, however
... that the defendant ... is entitled to a new trial on the charge of kidnapping in
the second degree, albeit for a different reason." Id. at 576-77 (Zarella, J.) (empha-
sis added).
83 Id. at 519. The majority concluded that stare decisis should not cause it to
hesitate to overrule prior holdings "once we are convinced that they were incorrect
and unjust." Id. at 521. And the majority set forth six nuanced reasons for its con-
clusion that the doctrine of legislative acquiescence did not bar review of the defen-
dant's claim. Id. at 521-28.
84 Id. at 530.
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ed many times the "claim that the crime of kidnapping was
not intended to apply to a restraint that was merely inciden-
tal to the commission of another crime." 85 The majority
added that the developed law is that proof of kidnapping
"does not require proof that the victim was confined for any
minimum period of time or moved any minimum distance[,]"
that under double jeopardy principles "it is of no moment that
the confinement or movement that provides the basis of a
kidnapping conviction is merely incidental to the commis-
sion of another crime against the victim[,]" and that,
"[a]ccordingly, the proper inquiry for a jury evaluating a kid-
napping charge is not whether the confinement or movement
of the victim was minimal or incidental to another offense
against the victim but, rather, whether it was accomplished
with the requisite intent, that is, to prevent the victim's liber-
ation."8 6 The majority's "close examination" of the statutory
text revealed "an ambiguity" in the intent required for kid-
napping as opposed to unlawful restraint. 87
Finding that "the point at which an intended interference
with liberty crosses the line to become an intended preven-
tion of liberation is not entirely clear" 88 in the statutes and as
previously construed judicially, the majority sought guidance
extrinsically, i.e., from "the history and circumstances sur-
rounding the enactment of the kidnapping statutes, the poli-
cies that those statutes were designed to implement and their
relationship to common-law kidnapping principles." 89 After
an extensive analysis of those sources, the majority declared:
Upon examination of the common law of kidnapping, the his-
tory and circumstances surrounding the promulgation of our
85 Id. at 531 (citing nine cases).
86 Id. at 531-32.
87 Id. at 533-34 ("in accordance with the statutory definitions of the terms
'abduct' and 'restrain,' our decisions have established that a defendant may be con-
victed of kidnapping upon proof that he restrained a victim when that restraint is
accompanied by the requisite intent. Those previous decisions, however, have not
explored the parameters of that intent, in particular, how the 'intent to prevent [a vic-
tim's] liberation'; General Statutes § 53a-91 (2); that is, the intent necessary to estab-
lish an abduction, differs from the intent "to interfere substantially with [a victim's]
liberty"; General Statutes § 53a-91 (1); that is, the intent necessary to establish a
restraint.").
88 Id. at 534.
89 Id. at 535.
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current kidnapping statutes and the policy objectives animat-
ing those statutes, we now conclude the following: Our legis-
lature, in replacing a single, broadly worded kidnapping pro-
vision with a gradated scheme that distinguishes kidnappings
from unlawful restraints by the presence of an intent to pre-
vent a victim's liberation, intended to exclude from the scope
of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompany-
ing severe penalties those confinements or movements of a
victim that are merely incidental to and necessary for the
commission of another crime against that victim. Stated oth-
erwise, to commit a kidnapping in conjunction with another
crime, a defendant must intend to prevent the victim's libera-
tion for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than
that which is necessary to commit the other crime.9 0
The majority further recognized that its previous failure to
recognize the different intent needed for kidnapping as
opposed to unlawful restraint "largely has eliminated the dis-
tinction between restraints and abductions" and had "afford-
ed prosecutors virtually unbridled discretion to charge the
same conduct either as a kidnapping or as an unlawful
restraint despite the significant differences in the penalties
that attach to those offenses." 91
Finally, the Salamon majority decided that the defendant
was entitled to a new trial at which the jury would be instruct-
ed to differentiate between merely incident restraint during the
defendant's commission of another crime and the intent neces-
sary to prove kidnapping. 92 Relying on Salamon, the Supreme
Court reversed kidnapping convictions and has now ordered
new trials in State v. Sanseverino93 and State v. DeJesus.94
90 Id. at 542 (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 543-44.
92 Id. at 549-50.
93 287 Conn. 608, 618-26 (2008) (in Appellate Court defendant unsuccessfully
claimed kidnapping was vague-as-applied to his conduct; Supreme Court avoided
constitutional issue, found error under Salamon decision, issued same day; also ini-
tially found insufficient evidence to justify retrial), upon rehearing, 291 Conn. 574
(2009) (new trial ordered as remedy instead of acquittal).
94 DeJesus, 288 Conn. at 428-39. Interestingly, the DeJesus majority agreed
with Justice Zarella's dissent in Sanseverino in which he disagreed with the remedy
of an acquittal: "we are persuaded that our conclusion that there should have been
a judgment of acquittal in Sanseverino was incorrect, and that the proper remedy in
that case should have been a new trial. Accordingly, our conclusion in Sanseverino
hereby is overruled." De.Jesus, 288 Conn. at 437.
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V. SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
Appellate courts decided many suppression issues in
2008, most involving search and seizure and confessions
claims controlled by the federal constitution. In State v.
Betts,95 Justice Norcott for the Court rejected the defendant's
claim that his fiancee acted as an agent of the police when,
at the behest of the police, she retrieved from the bedroom
that she shared with the defendant an incriminating letter
from the defendant to her daughter - the victim. The opin-
ion usefully reviews case law that has dealt with the extent to
which citizen/police involvement may take place without
creating an agency relationship. 96
In State v. Kalphat,97 the Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress because
the defendant failed to establish standing to challenge a
police search of one of several boxes, sent by commercial
carrier to a person with a name other than the defendant's,
that contained more than a kilogram of marijuana. The
defendant picked up the boxes after police obtained a posi-
tive canine alert for illegal drugs in one of the boxes. 98
Testifying at the suppression hearing, the defendant did not
claim to be the package's addressee; thus the Supreme Court
concluded that he had not established that he had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the boxes at the time that they
were searched - which was before he took possession of
them.99 The Court also concluded that the record was defi-
cient to show that the addressee was his alias, which might
have established standing. 100
In State v. Foreman,l01 the Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Norcott, rejected the defendant's claim that
a DNA sample via an oral swab obtained by the police dur-
ing stationhouse questioning should be suppressed because
he had been arrested without probable cause, because his
95 286 Conn. 88 (2008).
96 Id. at 96-100.
97 285 Conn. 367 (2008).
98 Id. at 370-72.
99 Id. at 375-77.
100 Id. at 377-81.
101 288 Conn. 684 (2008).
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Miranda waiver was not valid, his invocation of his right to
counsel was not honored, because the police "intentionally
thwarted" contact with his attorney in violation of State v.
Stoddard,102 and because the defendant did not voluntarily
consent to give a DNA sample. The Court held that the
record was inadequate to review the illegal arrest claim
because it was not argued in the trial court and thus the trial
court neither made findings nor drew conclusions concerning
his arrest status and the presence or absence of probable
cause. 103 The Court found that the defendant had waived his
Miranda rights after receiving proper warnings, though at a
time when he was in the police station voluntarily, not yet in
"custody," and that the trial court correctly found that he had
not requested counsel. 104 Closely reviewing the evidence
concerning when private counsel had made an effort to visit
and consult with the defendant on the evening of his arrest,
the Court concluded that the trial court was correct in finding
that there was no Stoddard violation because the attorney's
efforts came after the police obtained consent to take a DNA
sample. 105 Finally, the Court rejected the defendant's claim
that his signed consent to the police taking a DNA sample
was invalid because the police did not inform him of their
purpose in obtaining it.106
In State v. Grant,107 the Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Rogers, rejected the defendant's
claim that a warrant authorizing the taking of a sample of his
blood is "subject to a heightened evidentiary standard"
beyond the probable cause standard] 08 and rejected his claim
102 206 Conn. 157 (1988).
103 Foreman, 288 Conn. at 692-94.
104 Id. at 699-700.
105 Id. at 701-06.
106 Id. at 708-09. There is no indication in Foreman that the defendant asked
the Court to consider state and federal law relating to genetic research or human sub-
jects protection that might provide a basis for recognizing DNA samples as sui
generis search objects, given the range of information that DNA testing may dis-
close, thus providing a possible rationale for requiring particularized consent to the
warrantless taking and use of DNA samples.
107 286 Conn. 499, cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 721, 127 L.Ed.2d 200 (2008).
108 Id. at 513-14. In an interesting footnote, the Court disagrees with Professor
LaFave's interpretation of the Court's decision in State v. Acquin, 177 Conn. 352
(1979). State v. Grant, 286 Conn. at 514 n. 9 (discussing Acquin and 2 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE (4th Ed. 2004) § 4.1(e), p. 459 & 459 n. 100).
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that the affidavit supporting the warrant failed to establish
probable cause to infer that the defendant's blood had been
found at the crime scene, a murder in a New Haven parking
garage in 1973.109 The Court also rejected the defendant's
claim that the trial court should have ordered a Franks hear-
ing on whether the police affidavit in support of the search
warrant had materially misled the judge who issued the war-
rant. 110 The Grant Court also rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that statements the defendant offered to police after his
arrest were suppressible as the product of "interrogation"
because an officer had upon his earlier arrest told him that
blood evidence, not just fingerprint evidence, connected him
to the murder scene. The test for "interrogation" is set forth
in Rhode Island v. Innis. 111 The Court held that the Innis test
does not set out a "per se rule" that post-arrest police con-
frontation of a suspect with incriminating evidence always
constitutes interrogation: "Rather, whether such conduct con-
stituted an interrogation depends on whether it was a normal
incident of arrest and custody or, instead, was intended to
elicit an incriminating response."'" 12
In State v. Robinson,113 Judge Borden for a split Appellate
Court rejected the defendant's claim that the police lacked
probable cause to arrest him for criminal trespass and that evi-
dence discovered during a search incident to that arrest should
have been suppressed. The Court rejected the defendant's
argument that an element of third degree criminal trespass, that
premises be "fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner
designed to exclude intruders," cannot be established unless
there is a gate instead of an opening for ingress and egress, so
as to signal that only those with legitimate purposes may be on
the premises 14 Judge Bishop dissented on that issue, but the
Supreme Court has since affirmed in aper curiam opinion. 115
109 Id. at 515-18.
110 Id. at 518-22 (applying Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.154 (1978)).
H] 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
112 Grant, 286 Conn. at 526.
13 105 Conn. App. 179, aff'd, 290 Conn. 381 (2009) (per curiam).
114 Id. at 190-96. The dissent placed a more restrictive gloss on the word
"enclosed" in the statute. Compare id. at 195-96 (Borden, J.) with id. at 205-07
(Bishop, J., dissenting).
115 State v. Robinson, 290 Conn. 381 (2009) (per curiam).
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The case also includes a useful explication of the standard for
a warrantless strip search pursuant to a misdemeanor arrest and
the distinction between a strip search and a body cavity
search. 1 16
In State v. Fausel,117 the Appellate Court sustained the
defendant's claim that police violated the Fourth Amendment
when they entered and searched his home in the process of
pursuing and seizing the defendant's friend for driving while
under suspension and reckless driving. Judge Bishop for the
Court first noted the difference between the emergency doc-
trine and the exigent circumstances doctrine, then agreed
with the defendant that the facts did not support either excep-
tion to the warrant requirement and that the trial court should
have granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence
found in the defendant's house. 118 The Supreme Court has
granted the state's petition to appeal the decision.11 9
The Supreme Court has granted the state's petitions to
appeal in several other cases where the defendant prevailed
in the Appellate Court in 2008. In State v. Clark,120 Judge
Bishop for a split Appellate Court rejected the state's claim
that the trial court erred in finding that the police lacked rea-
sonable suspicion to stop the defendant in a car several hours
after receiving a telephone tip from a confidential informant
saying that the defendant was selling drugs in the Hill section
of New Haven and that he was driving a tan Chevrolet Cobalt
with Pennsylvania license plates. 12 1 Judge Beach dissented,
calling it a "close case," but arguing that the tip provided rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the infor-
mant's reliability in the past, because the tip "predicted, if
somewhat generally, the location of the car and, with partic-
116 Robinson, 105 Conn. App. at 196-200.
117 109 Conn. App. 820 (2008), cert. granted, 289 Conn. 940 (2008).
118 Id. at 826-3 1.
119 The certified issue in the Supreme Court is: "Did the Appellate Court prop-
erly reverse the trial court's suppression ruling that the police were justified in enter-
ing the defendant's house without a warrant?" State v. Fausel, 289 Conn. 940 (2008).
120 107 Conn. App. 819 (2008), cert. granted, 288 Conn. 916 (2008). The cer-
tified issue in the Supreme Court is: "Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the
trial court's ruling that the evidence seized from the defendant's vehicle and person
should be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal seizure?"
121 Id. at 821-22, 827-29.
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ularity, the association of the defendant with the car," even
though there was no indication of his basis of knowledge for
the tip. 122 In State v. Mitchell,123 Judge Bishop for the Court
found that an officer's questioning of a suspect just taken into
custody, to find out if he knew why he had been apprehend-
ed, constituted custodial interrogation, that the defendant's
responses should have been suppressed because he had not
been given Miranda warnings, and that the error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.124
In an important decision, In re Kevin K.,125 involving
statutory protections accorded children who undergo police
questioning, Judge DiPentima for the Appellate Court, over
Judge Lavine's dissent, held that a thirteen-year-old's written
statement obtained by a Vernon police officer in the presence
of the juvenile's mother and signed by her and her son, was
inadmissible at his delinquency trial because the officer's
failure to give the warnings mandated by statute undermined
the voluntariness of the decision by the child and parent to
give a statement - despite the fact that the officer had prop-
erly given the required warnings to mother and son two days
earlier before taking a first statement. General Statutes
Section 46b-137(a) states that "any admission, confession or
statement" by a child to the police "shall be inadmissible" in
any hearing on the child's alleged delinquency unless it was
taken in the presence of a parent or parents or guardian "after
the parent or parents or guardian and child have been advised
(1) of the child's right to retain counsel, or if unable to afford
counsel, to have counsel appointed on the child's behalf, (2)
of the child's right to refuse to make any statements and (3)
that any statements he makes may be introduced into evi-
dence against him." 126 Judge DiPentima demonstrated the
122 Id. at 831-32.
123 108 Conn. App. 388, cert. granted, 289 Conn. 904 (2008). The certified
issue in the Supreme Court is: ""Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the
defendant's statement was admitted in violation of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [1(1966), and if so, was this harmful error requiring a new
trial?"
124 Id. at 394, 397-402.
125 109 Conn. App. 206, cert. granted, 289 Conn. 930 (2008). The certified
issue in the Supreme Court is: "Did the Appellate Court properly construe General
Statutes § 46b-137(a) to decide that before giving a second statement a re-advise-
ment of rights was required?"
126 Id. at 211 (court quotes § 46b-137(a) and supplies emphasis).
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ambiguity of the statute particularly with respect to the criti-
cal word "after," employing some nifty language from an
1846 Supreme Court case, Sands v. Lyon,127 to help make her
point. 12 8 Having established ambiguity, DiPentima consulted
extra-textual sources and concluded that "the purpose of the
statute is to help the child and his parent or guardian decide
whether to make a voluntary admission or to remain
silent."129 Ultimately Judge DiPentima concluded that the
circumstances in the case required reversal of the judgment
because "we do not find support in the facts set out in the
court's memorandum of decision for the conclusion that the
statement was admissible because we cannot conclude under
the totality of these circumstances that the respondent and his
parent made a valid decision to make a voluntary admission
that was not the product of coercion, suggestion, ignorance of
rights or adolescent fantasy, fright or despair."13 0
Dissenting, Judge Lavine agreed that the statute was ambigu-
ous, not because "after" has more than one "reasonable inter-
pretation," but rather because "the statute does not address
the length of time that permissibly may pass between the
time the juvenile is advised of his rights and signs a waiver
and the time a child gives a statement that is admissible."' 13 1
Finding the legislative history was deficient to show whether
readvisement was statutorily required under the facts of the
case, Judge Lavine drew an analogy to doctrine concerning
constitutional warnings, e.g., Miranda, which rejects "a per
se rule as to when a suspect must be readvised of his rights
127 18 Conn. 18, 27 (1846).
128 "We note parenthetically that our Supreme Court has acknowledged, in a
different situation, the difficulty with this word: 'The word "after" ... like "from,"
"succeeding," "subsequent," and similar words, where it is not expressly declared to
be exclusive or inclusive, is susceptible of different significations, and is used in dif-
ferent senses, and with an exclusive or inclusive meaning, according to the subject
to which it is applied; and, as it would deprive it of some of its proper significations
to affix one invariable meaning to it, in all cases, it would, of course, in many of
them, pervert it from the sense of the writer or speaker. Its true meaning, therefore,
in any particular case, must be collected from its context and subject matter, which
are only means by which the intention is ascertained. . . .' Sands v. Lyon, 18 Conn.
18, 27 (1846). " In re Kevin K., 109 Conn. App. at 212-13.
129 Id. at 218.
130 Id. at 223.
131 Id. at 228-29.
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after the passage of time[,]" 132 to support his conclusion that
"the purpose of the statute was met when the respondent and
his mother were advised and signed waiver or consent forms
prior to the respondent's giving a statement to the investigat-
ing police officer on October 11, 2005."133
VI. WAIVER AND PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In several cases defendants obtained new trials because
the trial record did not establish waiver of fundamental trial
rights that call for a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiv-
er by the defendant personally. In State v. Gore,134 the
Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's order of a new
trial 135 where trial counsel informed the trial court of the
defendant's decision to change his election from a jury to a
bench trial, but the defendant was not personally canvassed
on his change of election and did not otherwise indicate
agreement with his counsel's announcement regarding his
changed election. Because the record failed to satisfy the
Zerbst136 standard for waiver and because waiver of the right
to a jury trial may not be presumed from a silent record, 137
the Court in Gore held that the Appellate Court had properly
reviewed the constitutional issue under State v. Golding138
and had properly reversed the defendant's bench trial convic-
tion.139  Noting that the United States Supreme Court
"arguably has left open the question of whether a defendant's
waiver of the fundamental right to a jury trial must be
expressed explicitly on the record or whether it may be
implied through silence[,]" the Gore Court nonetheless cited
the "uniquely personal" nature of the right to a jury trial in
reaching its conclusion: "A trial court . . . may not assume
that counsel is invoking the wishes of the defendant when he
or she purports to waive a jury trial on the defendant's
132 Id. at 231 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
133 Id. at 223-24.
134 288 Conn. 770 (2008).
135 96 Conn. App. 758 (2006).
136 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
137 Gore, 288 Conn. at 777-78.
138 213 Conn. 233 (1989).
139 Gore, 288 Conn. at 789-90.
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behalf." 140  Further noting that "the constitution does not
mandate the particular form" that a defendant's personal
waiver of the right to a jury trial must take, the Gore Court
announced: "we hereby exercise our supervisory authority to
require prospectively that, in the absence of a written waiver,
the trial court must canvass the defendant briefly to ensure
that his or her personal waiver of a jury trial is made know-
ingly, intelligently and voluntarily."' 14 1  Following Gore's
constitutional holding, in State v. Mauro,142 the Appellate
Court used Golding review to reverse and order a new trial
where defense counsel had repeatedly-and erroneously-
assured the trial court that his client had previously been can-
vassed and had already waived his right to a jury trial. 143
The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial in
State v. TR.D.,144 where the trial court's canvas of the defen-
dant was inadequate to establish a knowing, intelligent and
voluntary waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to the assis-
tance of counsel at the trial which resulted in his conviction
of failing to register as a sex offender in violation of General
Statutes Sections 54-251 and 54-257.145 Unlike the jury
cases previously discussed, this was a case where the issue
140 Id. at 783.
141 Id. at 786-87 (emphasis added).
142 111 Conn. App. 368 (2008).
143 Emphasizing that the right to a jury trial may be waived only by the defen-
dant personally, the Mauro Court declared: "this remains true no matter how many
attempts defense counsel may make to waive the right or whether counsel makes
mistaken representations to the court that a canvass has been made by another judge
and that the defendant himself has made a valid waiver." Id. at 374.
144 286 Conn. 191 (2008) (en banc).
145 Sex offender registration requirements and exposure to criminal sanctions
for their violation are sure to generate more appellate cases in the future. The major
revamping of the registration law was accomplished in 1998; many issues relating
to lifetime registration, ten year registration, and discretionary registration have not
yet been raised at the appellate level. In 2008 the Supreme Court reviewed and
rejected a defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering ten
years registration after accepting his guilty plea to risk of injury to a child. State v.
Arthur H., 288 Conn. 582 (2008). The Court rejected the defendant's argument that
the trial court had exercised its statutory discretion solely based on its finding that
he had committed the crime for a sexual purpose. A finding of sexual purpose is pre-
requisite to a sentencing court's consideration of whether to order registration but it
does not raise a "presumption" that there is a risk to public safety so as to require
registration. The Court found that the trial court had relied on other factors, includ-
ing future dangerousness: "it seems clear from the record that the trial court did
weigh this factor in deciding to order registration." Id. at 593-95.
2009]
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concerned the adequacy, not the existence, of a canvas to
waive a basic trial right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
The defendant claimed that "his waiver of counsel was not
knowing, intelligent and voluntary because the trial court
failed to inform him of the range of possible penalties that he
would face upon conviction." 146 Applying on-point prece-
dent, State v. Diaz,14 7 the five justice majority in TR.D. con-
cluded: "as in Diaz, there is simply no evidence present in the
record from which we could infer that the defendant had any
meaningful appreciation of the period of incarceration he
faced if convicted of the charges he faced." 148
In the coming year, the Supreme Court may explicate on
appellate review under State v. Golding and its relationship to
waiver doctrine under State v. Fabricatore.149
VII. CONFRONTATION AND CONSOLIDATION
Courts continue to explore the contours of the United
States Supreme Court's paradigm-shifting confrontation
clause decision five years ago in Crawford v. Washington.150
in which the Court held that the confrontation clause bars
admission of hearsay statement that are "testimonial" in
nature if the declarant is "unavailable" as a trial witness and
146 Id. at 198-99.
147 274 Conn. 818 (2005).
148 TR.D., 286 Conn. at 206. Justice Schaller, joined by Justice Norcott, in dis-
sent argued that the defendant in TR.D. adamantly insisted on discharging his trial
counsel, making the record regarding waiver of counsel inapposite to that in Diaz,
and that the two cases are further distinguishable on other grounds, including "the
magnitude of the possible sentence in the overall picture" in Diaz-exposure to a
sentence of nearly fifty years and actual imposition of a forty-three year sentence as
compared to the exposure of five years and actual imposition of a lesser sentence in
TR.D. Id. at 229-32.
149 State v. Fabricatore, 281 Conn. 469 (2007). See, e.g., State v. Akande, 111
Conn. App. 596, 606-10 (2008) (discussing Golding review and express and implied
waivers of claims under Fabricatore and State v. Brewer, 283 Conn. 352 (2007)),
cert. granted, 290 Conn. 918 (2009) (certified issue: "Did the Appellate Court prop-
erly determine that the defendant waived his claim that the jury instructions were
constitutionally deficient?").
150 541 U.S. 36 (2004). No doubt Crawford's architect, Justice Scalia, would
be sensitive to any implication that the decision created a new paradigm for the con-
frontation clause since the decision's generative force stems from its recovering and
reintroduction of the clause's original historical purpose, i.e., to require trial by chal-
lengeable testimony and not trial by evidence that functions in lieu of testimony,
e.g., trial by affidavit.
[Vol. 83
2009) DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNECTICUT CRIMINAL LAW 2008 193
the defendant has not had an opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant about the statement. Last year the Connecticut
Supreme Court reviewed several cases that delved into the
nuances of the unavailability and testimonial elements in the
Crawford rule. In two cases the Supreme Court held that the
confrontation clause is not implicated under Crawford where
the out-of-court declarant is available at trial to be cross-
examined but is claimed to be "functionally unavailable" to
the defense by dint of a loss of memory or the witness's out-
right denial that he ever made the out-of-court statement. In
State v. Simpson, 151 a child witness testified that "she did not
recall" making statements recorded in a videotape interview
of her that was part of a DCF and police investigation of sex-
ual assault and risk of injury to a child by her great uncle, but
the Court rejected the defendant's claim that the com-
plainant's lack of recall made her 'functionally unavail-
able' and pointed out that she was extensively cross-exam-
ined at trial so as to satisfy the constitutional right to cross-
examine her. 152  Similarly, in State v. Holness,153  the
Supreme Court rejected the claim that admission of a signed,
written statement of a witness to police violated the con-
frontation clause because the witness at trial testified that he
"did not recognize" the statement and "did not recall telling
the police most of what appeared in the statement." 154
In State v. Slater,155 Justice Katz for the Court provided a
thorough review of the standard for deciding whether a state-
ment is testimonial in nature under Crawford and later cases
that have refined the meaning of "testimonial."1 56 In Slater,
the Court wrote: "Although we recognize that there is no
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,' it is clear that
much of the Supreme Court's and our own jurisprudence
151 286 Conn. 634 (2008).
152 Id. at 636-37, 651-55.
153 289 Conn. 535 (2008).
154 Id. at 546-50.
155 285 Conn. 162, cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2885, 171 L.Ed.2d 822 (2008).
156 Justice Katz makes clear that Crawford is correctly understood to have held
that "the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay statements" and
that the old doctrine applying a reliability test to all challenged hearsay has been
abandoned by most courts, in light of Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
Slater, 285 Conn. at 169-71 and n. 6.
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applying Crawford largely has focused on the reasonable
expectation of the declarant that, under the circumstances, his
or her words later could be used for prosecutorial purpos-
es." 157  In Slater the Court affirmed the Appellate Court's
previous conclusion that statements made by the victim of a
sexual assault to passersby on the street from whom she
sought help and to medical personnel who administered a
rape kit did not constitute "testimonial" hearsay and thus did
not implicate the confrontation clause1 58 because in each
instance the specific circumstances "would not have led the
victim to believe that her statements . . . would be used at
trial." 159 Justice Katz also wrote the Court's opinion in State
v. Smith, 160 rejecting the defendant's claim that admission of
a four-hour recording of a conversation between his co-con-
spirator and a cellmate violated Crawford because the cell-
mate, deported before trial, was unavailable for cross-exam-
ination in a murder trial and had made testimonial statements
triggering the confrontation guarantee. 16 1
State v. Snelgrove, discussed previously, involved the con-
solidation for trial of three murder charges where evidence of
each was cross-admissible as uncharged misconduct to prove
the other charges, thereby undermining the defendant's claim
that the joint trial prejudiced him. A number of other 2008
cases involved severance and consolidation claims. In State
157 Id. at 172 (emphasis added). The Court later wrote: "We emphasize, how-
ever, that this expectation must be reasonable under the circumstances and not some
subjective or far-fetched, hypothetical expectation that takes the reasoning in
Crawford and Davis to its logical extreme." Id. at 175.
158 Unavailability was established because the victim-declarant had died "of
causes unrelated to the assault." Id. at 167.
159 Id. at 177, 183-85. The Court emphasized that its conclusions were not cat-
egorical, but hinged on the specific circumstances surrounding each challenged
hearsay statement.
160 289 Conn. 598 (2008).
161 The defendant at trial conceded that his co-conspirator's highly incriminat-
ing statements in the conversation, implicating himself and the defendant in the
planning and commission of the murder and destruction of the body, were not testi-
monial so as to trigger Crawford protection, but did argue that the statements were
inadmissible under the older confrontation test, now abandoned, of Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980). Smith, 289 Conn. at 614, 616-17. Because of the defendant's
concession, the Court found that admission of the co-conspirator's recorded state-
ments did not raise a constitutional issue; id. at 630 n. 27; and held that they were
properly admitted under § 8-6(4) of the Code of Evidence as "a dual-inculpatory
statement against penal interest." Id. at 630.
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v. Davis,162 the Supreme Court found that the defendant was
not substantially prejudiced by his trial on three unrelated
informations, 16 3 one of which involved evidence of the defen-
dant's "brutal and shocking" conduct, because the trial court's
"thorough, explicit, and proper jury instructions cured the risk
of prejudice to the defendant and, therefore, preserved the
jury's ability to consider fairly and impartially the offenses
charged in the jointly tried cases."' 164 Concurring in the result,
Justice Katz wrote separately to make two points, one direct-
ed at trial courts called to rule upon motions for consolidation
and severance, the other directed at courts of review called to
decide whether joinder was proper.165 As to the trial standard,
Justice Katz would have the current presumption in favor of
joinder apply only in cases where substantive evidence is
cross-admissible as other crimes evidence; 166 otherwise "trial
courts should presume prejudice and grant joinder only when
the risk of prejudice appears to be 'substantially reduced."' 16 7
As to appellate review, Justice Katz would have courts make
two separate determinations, as to error and as to harm: "(1)
whether the trial court abused its discretion; and (2) whether
that impropriety constituted harmful error. We apply this
rubric to every other claim of nonconstitutional error, and I
see no reason to do otherwise in our review of a claim of
improper joinder."168
VIII. CONCLUSION
In 2009 it will be interesting to see whether the Supreme
Court on its own, or in coordination with judicial committees
162 286 Conn. 17 (2008).
163 The trial court granted the defendant's motion to sever fourth information
because it included evidence that the defendant threatened children at gunpoint in
their home, which "'could well fuel the prejudice of jurors against the defendant'
in the other three cases. Id. at 21-22.
164 Id. at 34-35.
165 Id. at 38-56 (Katz, J., concurring, joined by Palmer, J.).
166 Id. at 38-45.
167 Id. at 45.
168 Id.at 45-46. Justice Katz writes: "Although the dispositive question is prej-
udice, that question is viewed from a predictive perspective when considering
whether the trial court had abused its discretion when acting on the motion to join
or sever, but is viewed from a fully informed perspective when determining whether
improper joinder was harmful[.]" Id. at 48.
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or the legislature's Judiciary Committee, will look to clarify
the legal status of the Code of Evidence and to establish
appellate rules for review of evidentiary rulings based on the
Code. The legacy of DeJesus will also require that trial and
appellate courts establish boundaries for application of the
new propensity rule in prosecutions for sex offenses and
offenses that qualify under the Snelgrove test. It will be
interesting to see whether and how the rules and commentary
in the Code of Evidence will affect the propensity rule.
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